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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
own wrong doing, the fact remains that parents have consistently violated
custody decrees and been awarded relief in jurisdictions where they have
brought the child. As more disappointed parents scurry across state lines
with the child that was lawfully awarded to the other parent, the courts
would do well, one writer has stated,"t to examine this maligned doctrine
of comity.
Since all agree that the child's welfare is the controlling consideration,
theoretically all courts, using that as a basis for decision, would render the
same finding in any given factual situation. Why not, then, require that a
parent appeal to the court of the child's domicile? The application of the
domicile rule operates to make the parent do so and thus has the particular
advantage of tending to prevent such acts as were committed by the mother
in the, instant case.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURISDICTION -OVER FOREIGN
APPOINTED EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
Plaintiff, a New York resident, was seriously injured in an automobile
collision that took place on a New York highway. Deceased, the other participant in the accident and a resident of Indiana, died as a result of the accident before plaintiff brought suit. After serving process as provided in a
New York statute,' the plaintiff brought suit naming the administrator of
the decedent's estate as defendant. The defendant was appointed in Indiana, all of the estate assets were in Indiana, and he had given no actual
consent to jurisdiction by the New York courts. Held, for plaintiff on a
certified question of jurisdiction. By statute, the consent of a non-resident
user of state highways to jurisdiction is binding on the foreign-appointed
administrator of his estate. Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d
877 (1950).
The rendering of a judgment without jurisdiction over the parties is a
denial of "due process."2 But if there is a statute that provides for service
of process on an officer of the state as agent for non-resident users of state
highways, service inder the stattite (with proper notice) 3 will give the court
jurisdiction over the parties. 4 Such a statute does not allow the substitution
of executors of the decedent's estate where the decedent died either before
or after service of process on the state officer. 5 However, it has been hinted
21. See note 9 supra.

1. N.Y. VEHICLE AND rRAFic LAw § 52, a statute allowing service of process on
the Secretary of State as agent for a non-resident user of state highways, and in case of
death as agent for the executors and administrators of the decedent's estate.
2. U.S. CONsT. AMEND. V.; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
4. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
5. Warner v. Maddox, 68 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Va. 1946); Brogan v. Macklin, 126
Con. 92, 9 A.2d 499 (1939); Dowling v. Winters, 208 N.C. 521, 181 S.E. 751 (1935);

CASES NOTED
that if the substitution were provided for in the statute, the provision would
be valid.6 A court, generally, does not have jurisdiction over a foreignappointed executor or administrator of an estate, the assets of which are
out of the court's jurisdiction, without a waiver of jurisdiction? A general
statute that attempted to make such executors and administrators subject
to jurisdiction in a state other than the appointing state has been declared
unconstitutional, and judgments given under such a statute were not given
"full faith and credit." 9 Statutes substituting foreign-appointed executors
and administrators as parties in causes of action arising from the use of the
highways have been subsequently passed.10
Prior to the instant case, the courts in two state decisions, Oviatt v.
Garretson" and Plopa v. I)Du Pre," reached the same result on similar facts.
These decisions did not discuss or attack the major arguments against the
constitutionality of these statutes or the validity of judgments procured
under them. The courts merely said that since such statutes were a valid
exercise of state police power, judgments procured under them were valid.' 3
However, in Knop v. Anderson the court held a similar statute unconstitutional in a detailed and well reasoned opinion. The court said that any
action against an administrator or executor in his official capacity is governed by the probate law of the state and is necessarily an action in rem
(against the assets of the state) which must be pursued at the situs of the
estate res, 15 and that no contrary agreement by the decedent during his lifetime could change it. 1 Therefore, since there could be no jurisdiction over
an executor or administrator in his official capacity outside the state of his
appointment, a statute that attempted to establish such jurisdiction would
be unconstitutional as a deprivation of "due process."' 7
In the instant case' the court found an irrevocable agency by saying
that a state is not limited to the laws of agency in the exercise of its police
power and may create an irrevocable agency by statute. The court attempted
to solve the more difficult problem of finding the consent of the deceased
to jurisdiction over the executors and administrators of his estate by drawing
Boyd v. Lemmerman, 11 N.J. Misc. 701, 168 At. 47 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
6. See Young v. Porter Title & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 561, 178 Atl. 177, 180 (Sup.
Ct. 1935). But see Vecchione v. Palmer, 249 App. Div. 661, 291 N.Y.S. 537, 539
(2d Dep't 1936).
7. Vaughan v. Northrup, 40 U.S. 1 (1841); Hieline v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363,
128 N.E. 216 (1920); RESTATIMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 512-514 (1934).
8, McMaster v.Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925).
9.York v.Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 19 Tenn. 594, 93 S.W.2d 333 (1935).
10. IOwA CoDx ANN. § 321.448(.4) (1949); Micu. Comp. LAWS § 256.521

(1948).
11.
12.
13.
14.

205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943).
327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W.2d 777 (1950).
Id.at 779.
71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
15. Id.at 840.
16, Id. at 851.
17. Knoop v, Anderson, supra note 14.
18. Leighton v, Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 877 (1950).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
two analogies. The first was to a matrimonial situation in which the court
took jurisdiction over a foreign-appointed administrator at his request as a
matter of comity. 19 The second analogy was to the federal system in which
the court voiced grave doubts that the courts in other states must give this
regardless of where they were appointed, but with the qualification that
whatever judgments might be rendered would be subject to all of the laws
of the state making the appointment including the probate law. 20 The
judgments given in these two analogies were weak because they were subject to complete review in other jurisdictions, and even in the instant case
the court voiced grave doubts that the courts in other states must give this
21
judgment "full faith and credit."

Until there is a decision by the court of last resort on this point, there
can be no settled law. Moreover, there seems to be a conflict of authority
and reasoning on this point between federal and state courts. At present,
these judgments can validly be rendered, but they are subject to complete
review by the courts of another state. As a matter of fact, if followed at all,
they will be followed by the courts of other states only as a matter of comity.

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPBANK OFFICIAL AND LOAN APPLICANT
An applicant for a loan from a cooperative bank brought suit in equity
to obtain title to land, which a bank official had bought in his wife's name.
Through his position on the bank's security committee, he had secured, in
expressed confidence, oral information regarding the land's value, location,
and low purchase price from the applicant. A statute required two members of the security committee to approve a written application containing
this information before a loan could be granted. The trial court dismissed
the complaint. Held, that the official holds the land under a constructive
trust for the loan applicant, as a result of having purchased it in violation of
the fiduciary relationship that existed because of the information conveyed
to him in confidence. \Varsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612 (Mass. 1950).
The rule is well established that breach of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship 2 will cause courts of equity to impress a constructive trust on the
profits or property gained thereby.3 rThe trustee will be compelled to convey
19. Id. at 878.
20. Id. at 879.
21. Id. at 881.
170, § 26 (1948).
2. The terms fiduciary and confidential are used interchangeably; see Bogart, Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 237 (1928)
(suggesting that the former term be limited to the more formal and customary relationships).
3. Yamins v. Zeith, 322 Mass. 268, 76 N.E.2d 769 (1948); Beatty v. Guggenheim
Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919) (Cardoza, I., "When
1. MASS. ANN. LAws c.

